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The purpose of this paper is to provide an easy template for the inclusion of the Bayes factor in reporting experimental results, particularly as a recommendation for articles in the
Journal of Problem Solving. The Bayes factor provides information with a similar purpose
to the p-value—to allow the researcher to make statistical inferences from data provided
by experiments. While the p-value is widely used, the Bayes factor provides several advantages, particularly in that it allows the researcher to make a statement about the alternative
hypothesis, rather than just the null hypothesis. In addition, it provides a clearer estimate of
the amount of evidence present in the data. Building on previous work by authors such as
Wagenmakers (2007), Rouder et al. (2009), and Masson (2011), this article provides a short
introduction to Bayes factors, before providing a practical guide to their computation using
examples from published work on problem solving.

The world of psychology and many related disciplines is
dominated by the p-value. The publication of studies hinges
upon a magical number—either .01 or .05—that plays a deciding role in whether the data are thought to reflect an actual difference, or random happenstance. The p-value is, in
a word, pervasive. However, just because a measure is ubi
quitous does not necessarily mean that it is the best measure.
There have long been arguments for alternative statistical
approaches (e.g., Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963), and
recently there has been a growing movement towards alternative analyses that overcome some of the shortcomings of
null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and the associated p-values (Dienes, 2011; Gallistel, 2009; Johnson, 2013;
Nuzzo, 2014). In particular, Bayesian methods, and Bayes
factors, have been suggested as an excellent alternative (see
Wagenmakers, 2007 for a thorough discussion of this alternative). In a similar vein to Masson (2011), the main goal
of this paper is to provide a practical, procedural outline of
how to estimate Bayes factors for both t-tests and regression
analyses with output from common statistical programs,
such as SPSS, using previously published findings from research on problem solving as examples. The focus will be
on estimating Bayes factors using the BIC method, which
allows for computations that are mathematically straightforward, and do not require specialized statistical programs
or knowledge. That said, there are many more sophisticated
approaches that should be considered by researchers interested in using these measures (Liang, Paulo, Molina, Clyde,
& Berger, 2008; Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder, Morey,
Speckman, & Province, 2012).

Issues with Null-Hypothesis Significance Tests
Given the importance of p-values to psychological studies, it
is somewhat strange how little thought is given to their peculiarities. Everyone is taught the constraints of NHST’s in
their first statistics class, and yet little is done to account for
them in practice. For example, it is common knowledge that
running more participants increases the likelihood of finding a significant result, but few remember that it violates an
assumption of NHST to “just run an extra five participants”
as they chase significance (Wagenmakers, 2007). Likewise,
we are all taught that .05 is the cutoff most often used to demonstrate significant results, but often forget that this is an arbitrary number, and that it may not always be the appropriate
cutoff for a given study (nor may it be appropriate at all; see
Johnson, 2013). Wagenmakers (2007) provides an excellent
summary of some of the overarching issues of commonly
used NHST, also referred to as the “frequentist approach.”
His points are summarized below:
1. The p-value depends on hypothetical data. That is to
say, the sampling distribution represents many iterations of the same experiment, assuming the null
hypothesis is true. These data are never actually observed, and this can lead to some logical quandaries.
2. The p-value depends on the intentions of the researcher.
NHST is based on the idea that the experimenter has
created a sampling plan with fixed stopping conditions
regarding data collection, something that in practice
may not always be the case. It has been demonstrated
that, should an experimenter employ optional stopping,
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they are virtually guaranteed to find a significant result
eventually (Jennison & Turnbull, 1990).
3. The p-value does not grant statistical evidence. A p-value
of .05 in a study with 20 people does not imply the
same amount of evidence against the null hypothesis
as the same p-value in a study with 200 people (or,
to further emphasize this point, 2000 people). Large
sample sizes will find tiny differences between groups
to result in a “significant difference,” whether or not
such a difference has any “practical” significance. In
terms of probability, it is incorrect to assume that two
p-values from studies of different sample sizes carry
the same statistical weight of evidence.
Perhaps the most salient point made by Wagenmakers (2007)
is a consideration of what is being compared when using a frequentist approach. That is to say, nothing is being compared.
4. A frequentist approach to NHST considers only the extremeness of the data under the null hypothesis, with no
consideration of the alternative hypothesis. In reality, it
may be that neither the null nor the alternative hypothesis are good fits for the current data, suggesting that a
comparative approach may result in a clearer picture.
Given the above, it is clear that the p-value does not deliver all that we expect it to. Indeed, many of the assumptions
made about p-values are incorrect (Wagenmakers, 2007).

The Advantages of the Bayesian Approach
As opposed to a frequentist approach, a Bayesian approach
to hypothesis testing is comparative in nature. That is, the
likelihood of the data is considered under both the null and
alternative hypotheses, and these probabilities are compared
via the Bayes factor. The Bayes factor is a ratio that contrasts
the likelihood of the data fitting under the null hypothesis
with the likelihood of fitting under the alternative hypothesis. One simplified way to express this is:
BF01 =

likelihood of data given H0
likelihood of data given H1

Therefore, as BF01 increases, there is more evidence in support of the null hypothesis, and less in favor of the alternative
hypothesis. Taking the inverse yields the opposite; if 1 / BF01 = 5,
that suggests that the data are five times more likely to occur under the alternative hypothesis compared to the null hypothesis.
This method addresses each of the previously listed concerns, as discussed by Wagenmakers (2007):
1. The p-value depends on hypothetical data. The Bayesian approach considers only the observed data, and
how those data relate to the null and alternative
hypotheses.
2. The p-value depends on the intentions of the researcher.
Bayesian approaches are not altered by stopping or

measurement criteria (Rouder, 2014). Indeed, in a full
Bayesian analysis, analyzing one batch of data can be
used to inform the analysis of the next batch.
3. The p-value does not grant statistical evidence. Because
Bayes factors are ratios of probabilities, two Bayes factors of equal value represent the same amount of evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis, regardless
of sample size or other extraneous factors.
4. A frequentist approach to NHST considers only the extremeness of the data under the null hypothesis, with
no consideration of the alternative hypothesis. All
Bayesian approaches are comparisons of models. This
means that a Bayes factor considers the likelihood of
both the null and the alternative hypothesis. From the
researcher’s standpoint, this is likely closer to their
overall goal than simply rejecting the null hypothesis.
One issue that is often raised about Bayesian analyses is
that they require a “prior”; that is, a prior probability distribution for the model parameters. Coming up with such an estimate can be problematic as it can require a certain amount
of subjectivity and/or prior knowledge about the effect that
is to be studied. However, a number of fairly objective priors
have been developed, that make relatively few assumptions
about the parameters. By using Bayesian information criteria (BIC) to estimate Bayes factors using the following equation, a “unit information prior” is assumed (Masson, 2011;
Wagenmakers, 2007). This is a prior probability distribution
assuming probable values for the effect size are represented
by a normal distribution, centered on the effect size observed
in the data, and providing a standardized, conservative prior
probability for the effect size in the analysis. The equation for
estimating Bayes factors using BIC is as follows:
BF01 = e∆BIC10/2
This equation estimates Bayes factors using the difference
between the two BICs for the null and alternative hypotheses. Furthermore, these BICs can be calculated using output
received during a normal frequentist analysis, making analyses possible even without extensive statistical knowledge.
In the case of regression (and correlation), the BICs can be
computed using just the R2 value, the sample size, and the
number of predictor variables. In the case of ANOVA (and ttests), the BICs can be computed using the sum of squares for
each experimental effect (which may include interactions),
the error term, and the total, as well as the sample size and
the number of independent variables (and interactions).

Computing the Bayes Factor for a Regression Analysis
A study on the role of distraction in performance on a problem solving task can be used to illustrate the computation
of BICs from regression analyses. In this study, Jarosz and
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Table 1.
Estimating Bayes Factor from Regression (Jarosz & Wiley, 2012)

Calculation
Estimating BIC for H0
Estimating BIC for H1

Parameters
BIC = n * ln(1 – R2) + k * ln(n)
BIC = n * ln(1 – R2) + k * ln(n)

Data
BIC = 64 * ln(1 – .04) + 2 * ln(64) = 5.71
BIC = 64 * ln(1 – .21) + 3 * ln(64) = -2.61

Change in BIC

ΔBIC10 = BICH1 – BICH0

ΔBIC10 = -2.61 – 5.71 = -8.32

Bayes Factor

BF01 = e

BF01 = e-.8.32 / 2 = .016

ΔBIC10 / 2

Wiley (2012) created two versions of the Raven Advanced
Progressive Matrices (RAPM). In one condition, the most
commonly selected incorrect answer (the “salient distracter”)
was excluded from the response bank of each item, while
in the other condition a different, less salient response was
removed and the salient distracter remained. The condition
in which the high salience distracters appeared was referred
to as the high salience item condition, while the condition
where only low salience distracters appeared was referred to
as the low salience item condition. The results of the hierarchical regression predicting working memory capacity were
reported as described below:
A hierarchical regression predicting composite span
score was performed with low salience item accuracy as
a predictor in the first step, and high salience item accuracy as a predictor in the second step. While the initial
model was marginally significant, F(1, 62) = 2.86, p = .10,
the addition of high salience item performance resulted
in a significant model, with a significant change in the
R2 value, R = .46, ΔR2 = .17, ΔF(1, 61) = 12.79, p = .001.
In the final model, low salience item performance did
not predict composite span score (β = −.06, t(61) = −.46,
ns), while high salience item performance did (β = .49,
t(61) = 3.58, p = .001, sr2 = .41). (Jarosz & Wiley, 2012,
p. 432)
In this regression, there was a significant increase in model
fit for performance on items that included the salient distracter over performance on items that excluded the salient distracter. These results were interpreted as showing a unique role
for distraction in explaining the WMC–RAPM relationship:
The results of this study strongly support the idea that
salient distracters among response options contribute
to the WMC–RAPM correlation. . . . When placed hierarchically into a regression, performance on the high
salience items predicted variance in the composite span
score above and beyond low salience item performance,
and remained the only unique predictor. This follows the
prediction of the attentional control account, suggesting
that high WMC individuals are better able to avoid distraction from the highly salient incorrect option within
the response bank. (Jarosz & Wiley, 2012, p. 432)

These data can be re-examined using Bayesian methods to
compare the initial model to the final model (Table 1). The first
step is to find the unexplained variance for both the model representing the null hypothesis (in this case, a the model including only performance on items with low salience distracters,
or the first step of the hierarchical regression) and the alternative hypothesis (a model with performance on both low and
high salience distracter items, or the second step of the regression). The unexplained variance for the alternative hypothesis
can be computed as (1 – total variance explained in the second step). The R for the second step was .46, which makes
the R2 = .21 and the unexplained variance is (1 – .21) = .79.
For the null hypothesis, we need to compute the unexplained
variance for the first step of the regression. Since the change in
variance explained by the second step was .17, this makes the
variance explained by the first step .21 – .17 = .04. Thus, the
total unexplained variance for the first step is (1 – .04) = .96.
One could also find the variance explained (R2) for each model directly from the SPSS regression output.
From this information it is possible to calculate a BIC for
each model. The BIC for a regression model (Wagenmakers,
2007) is equivalent to
BIC = n × ln(1 – R2) + k × ln(n)
where k is the number of free parameters or predictors (in
this case, the number of regressors plus the intercept), and n
is the total sample size (although see Masson, 2011, with regards to the value of n in within-subjects designs). The BIC for
the model of the null hypothesis is represented by BIC = 64 ×
ln(.96) + 2 × ln(64) = 5.71, (k has a value of 2 in the null hypothesis model, as there are two predictors, low salience item
performance and the intercept). For the alternative hypothesis, the model has a BIC of BIC = 64 × ln(.79) + 3 × ln(64) =
-2.61 (where k = 3 because there are three predictor variables).
The next step is to compare the difference between the two
BICs by inserting them into this equation:
ΔBIC10 = BICH1 – BICH0
And finally, a transformation converts the change in BICs
into a Bayes factor estimate:
BF01 = e∆BIC10/2
This leads to ΔBIC10 = -2.61 – 5.71 = -8.32, and a Bayes
factor of BF01 = e-.8.32 / 2 = .016.
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Table 2.
Estimating Bayes Factor From Between-Subjects t-tests/ANOVAs (Jarosz et al., 2012; Insight Rating Findings)

Calculation
Unexplained variance H0
Unexplained variance H1
Estimating BIC for H0
Estimating BIC for H1

Parameters
1 – R = (SSerror + SScondition) / SStotal
1 – R2 = SSerror / SStotal
BIC = n * ln(1 – R2) + k * ln(n)
BIC = n * ln(1 – R2) + k * ln(n)

Data
1 – R = (48.43 + 4.05) / 587.82 = .089
1 – R2 = 48.43 / 587.82 = .082
BIC = 40 * ln(.089) + 1 * ln(40) = -93.08
BIC = 40 * ln(.082) + 2 * ln(40) = -92.66

Change in BIC

ΔBIC10 = BICH1 – BICH0

ΔBIC10 = -92.66 – (-93.08) = .42

Bayes Factor

BF01 = eΔBIC10 / 2

BF01 = e.42 / 2 = 1.23

2

This Bayes factor suggests that the data are .016 times
more likely to occur under the null hypothesis than under
the alternative hypothesis. Alternatively, taking the inverse
puts this value in terms of the alternative hypothesis, 1 / .016
= 62.50. This means that the data are 62.50 times more likely
to occur under the alternative hypothesis than under the null
hypothesis. Using this new information we can expand the
previously published results to include the Bayes factor (with
added text in brackets and italics):
A hierarchical regression predicting composite span
score was performed with low salience item accuracy as a predictor in the first step, and high salience
item accuracy as a predictor in the second step. While
the initial model was marginally significant, F(1, 62) =
2.86, p = .10, the addition of high salience item performance resulted in a significant model, with a significant
change in the R2 value, R = .46, ΔR2 = .17, ΔF(1, 61) =
12.79, p = .001. In the final model, low salience item
performance did not predict composite span score (β
= −.06, t(61) = −.46, ns), while high salience item performance did (β = .49, t(61) = 3.58, p = .001, sr2 = .41).
[In addition, the data were examined by estimating a
Bayes factor using Bayesian Information Criteria (Wagenmakers, 2007). This compares the fit of the data under the
null hypothesis, compared to the alternative hypothesis. An
estimated Bayes factor (null/alternative) suggested that the
data were .016:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or
rather, 62.50 times more likely to occur under a model including an effect for salient distracters than a model without it.] (Jarosz & Wiley, 2012, p. 432)
For computation of the Bayes factor for correlations, one
can use the same approach as outlined above, comparing the
variance explained (correlation squared) for two predictors
versus one predictor (the intercept).

Computing the Bayes Factor for ANOVAs and t-tests
BIC analyses can also be applied to analysis of variance
(ANOVA) and t-tests, using sum of squares to compute the

2

unexplained variance. This section will focus primarily on
the computations for between-subjects t-tests, though the
analyses and discussion can be applied to between-subjects
ANOVA as well. The unexplained variance for the model
containing the alternative hypothesis involving an independent variable is represented by SSerror / SStotal, while the unexplained variance for the null hypothesis is represented by
(SSerror + SSindependentvarianble) / SStotal—that is, a model where the
variance explained by the independent variable is included
as part of the unexplained variance.
To illustrate the estimation of a Bayes factor from an
ANOVA/t-test, we can revisit the findings of Jarosz, Colflesh,
and Wiley (2012), who explored the impact of moderate intoxication due to alcohol on creative problem solving. Using
an alcohol intoxication condition and a control condition,
each with 20 participants, they had participants solve a number of remote associates test (RAT) problems while rating
whether they felt they had solved the problems insightfully,
or analytically. Using a frequentist approach, they first reported a marginal difference in feelings of insight:
On average, intoxicated individuals tended to rate their
experience of problem solving as being more insightful
(M = 3.98) than the sober participants (M = 3.35, t(38)
= 1.78, p < .08). (Jarosz, et al., 2012, p. 490)
Re-analyzing these data from a Bayesian perspective requires several steps. First, sums of squares must be calculated.
This can easily be accomplished by re-analyzing the data using an ANOVA in any common statistical program (although
note that the total sum of squares is not always displayed,
depending on the ANOVA performed—this may need to be
calculated by adding together the other sums of squares). Doing so yields 4 sums of squares: the intercept, at 535.34; the
alcohol condition variable, at 4.05; the error term, at 48.43;
and the total sum of squares, at 587.82. The unexplained variance for the model containing the alternative hypothesis (that
intoxicated individuals would differ in their problem ratings
from sober individuals) is represented by SSerror / SStotal, while
the null hypothesis would represent unexplained error by
(SSerror + SSalcohol) / SStotal. Thus, the unexplained variance for
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the model representing the alternative hypothesis is 48.43 /
587.82 = .082, while the unexplained variance for the model
representing the null hypothesis is (48.43 + 4.05) / 587.82 =
.089. These values are plugged into the equations as shown
in Table 2. For an ANOVA, k includes the intercept and the
independent variable. The Bayes factor is found to be BF01 =
1.23, with an inverse of 1 / 1.23 = .81.
This suggests that the data actually provide more support
for the null hypothesis, being 1.23 times more likely to occur under the null hypothesis, compared to the alternative
hypothesis. Updating the results to include the Bayes factor
(again with new text in brackets and italics) leads to:
On average, intoxicated individuals tended to rate their
experience of problem solving as being more insightful
(M = 3.98) than the sober participants (M = 3.35, t(38)
= 1.78, p < .08). [However, the data were also examined
by estimating a Bayes factor using Bayesian Information Criteria (Wagenmakers, 2007), comparing the fit of
the data under the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis. An estimated Bayes factor (null/alternative)
suggested that the data were 1.23:1 in favor of the null
hypothesis, or rather, 1.23 times more likely to occur under a model without including an effect of moderate alcohol intoxication, rather than a model with it.] (Jarosz
et al., 2012, p. 490)
Jarosz et al. (2012) also examined differences in problem
solving accuracy between sober and intoxicated individuals.
Here, they found a significant difference in creative performance using the Remote Associates Task:
More importantly, a second set of analyses examined
whether intoxication affected the actual solution of these
creative problems. On average, intoxicated participants
solved significantly more RAT problems (M = .58,
SD = .13) than their sober counterparts (M = .42,
SD = .16), t(38) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 1.08. (Jarosz et al.,
2012, p. 490)
Once again, re-analyzing these data from a Bayesian perspective requires several steps. The sums of squares were: .25

for the alcohol condition, .79 for the error term, and 11.11
for the total. The unexplained variance for the model containing the alternative hypothesis (that intoxication affects
problem solving) would be represented by SSerror / SStotal,
while the null hypothesis would represent unexplained error
by (SSerror + SSalcohol / SStotal). For the alternative hypothesis,
the unexplained variance is .79 / 11.11 = .071. For the null
hypothesis, the unexplained variance is equivalent to (.25 +
.79) / 11.11 = .094. As seen in Table 3, the Bayes factor is BF01
= .023. This suggests that the data are far less likely under the
null hypothesis than the alternative hypothesis. Taking the
inverse, 1 / .023 = 43.48 shows that the data are 43.48 times
more likely to occur under the alternative hypothesis than
under the null hypothesis. Thus, the results section could be
updated with the new information (in brackets and italics)
accordingly:
More importantly, a second set of analyses examined
whether intoxication affected the actual solution of
these creative problems. On average, intoxicated participants solved significantly more RAT problems (M =
.58, SD = .13) than their sober counterparts (M = .42,
SD = .16), t(38) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 1.08. [The estimated Bayes factor (null/alternative) suggested that the
data were .023:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or
rather, 43.48 times more likely to occur under the model
including an effect for alcohol, rather than the model
without it.] (Jarosz et al., 2012, p. 490)
Some adjustments may be needed for within-subjects
or repeated measures t-tests and ANOVAs, although there
remains some debate as to the best way to calculate n for
a repeated-measures ANOVA. While Wagenmakers (2007)
suggests that treating this value as the number of subjects is
fine, Masson (2011) suggests that treating this as the number of independent observations is more appropriate, Thus,
Masson suggests adjusting n to be the number of subjects,
multiplied by (number of conditions – 1). For a detailed review of how to calculate Bayes factors in ANOVA (and in
particular, ANOVA in a within-subjects design), please refer
to Masson (2011).

Table 3.
Estimating the Bayes Factor From Between-Subjects t-Tests/ANOVAs (Jarosz et al., 2012, Creative Problem Solving Performance
Findings)

Calculation
Unexplained variance H0
Unexplained variance H1
Estimating BIC for H0
Estimating BIC for H1

Parameters
1 – R = (SSerror + SScondition) / SStotal
1 – R2 = SSerror / SStotal
BIC = n * ln(1 – R2) + k * ln(n)
BIC = n * ln(1 – R2) + k * ln(n)

Data
1 – R = (.25 + .79) / 11.11 = .094
1 – R2 = .79 / 11.11 = .071
BIC = 40 * ln(.094) + 1 * ln(40) = -90.89
BIC = 40 * ln(.071) + 2 * ln(40) = -98.43

Change in BIC

ΔBIC10 = BICH1 – BICH0

ΔBIC10 = -98.43 – (-90.89) = -7.54

Bayes Factor

2

2

BF01 = e

BF01 = e-7.54 / 2 = .023

ΔBIC10 / 2
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Other Approaches to Estimating Bayes Factors
While the BIC provides an easy way to estimate the Bayes
factor based on output from more familiar NHST approaches, it is important to remember that the method outlined
above is a fairly rough approximation of the Bayes factor.
While it certainly gives a much better idea of the evidence
for and against one’s hypotheses than does the p-value, in
recent years several mathematical psychologists and statisticians have worked on developing better methods for calculating Bayes factors (Liang et al., 2008; Rouder & Morey,
2012; Rouder et al., 2012). In particular, the JZS approach
(advocated for by Rouder, Morey, and Wagenmakers, among
others; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) deserves mention. This method employs a prior based on work
by Jeffreys (1961) and Zellner and Siow (1980). Rouder and
colleagues highlight several issues with the BIC method of
approximation. First, the variance of the prior using the BIC
method is based on the observed sample variance; second,
the unit information prior is more informative than the JZS
prior, making the BIC method a less conservative alternative
with respect to the alternative hypothesis; and third, the BIC
method may not be well suited for mixed models in ANOVA. While the BIC method approximates the JZS method
for larger sample sizes, those using smaller samples or mixed
methods may be better served by employing the JZS method
to compute Bayes factors.
The calculations for deriving and employing the JZS
method are beyond the scope of this paper. Thankfully, there
is an online calculator available at http://pcl.missouri.edu/
bayesfactor that can be used to estimate Bayes factors based
on t values (in the case of t-tests) and R2 values (in the case of
regression), as well as sample size (Liang et al., 2008; Rouder
& Morey, 2012; Rouder et al., 2009). For t-tests, this supplies
both a BIC estimated Bayes factor, as well as the JZS Bayes
factor (Rouder et al., 2009). It should be noted that the webpages for calculating Bayes factors based on t-tests contain
an additional parameter, r. This factor is intended to be used
to scale the prior distribution. Leaving it as 1 does not scale
the distribution, while decreasing or increasing this value
will scale the prior to represent smaller or larger effect sizes,
respectively. This may be appropriate if one expects smaller
or larger effects in a study, however, the value of r should be
determined a priori, and it is generally recommended that
this value be left as 1 (Rouder et al., 2009).
Finally, it must be noted that various researchers have
begun implementing packages for full Bayesian analysis in
programs such as R, capable of handling most traditional
analyses (Morey & Rouder, 2011; Rouder & Morey, 2012;
Rouder et al., 2012; Rouder et al., 2009). These allow the
R-savvy researcher to complete Bayesian analyses without
having to transform results from other traditional statistics

programs. In addition, there is currently an effort to provide
an open source Bayes factor alternative to popular statistical programs (“JASP”, 2014). Together, these provide a wide
variety of more advanced options with regards to computing
Bayes factors.

Interpreting Bayes Factors
The advantage of the Bayes factor is that it is not just a measure of how unlikely the null hypothesis is, but rather, a comparison of how likely the null is compared to the alternative.
That is, instead of simply saying “It is unlikely that there is no
relationship between these variables,” the researcher is able
to say “this alternative model is considerably better than the
null, and I have the probabilities to prove it!” The Bayes factor allows for the inclusion of a statement in the results of
how much more likely the data are to occur if the null hypothesis is true, compared to if the alternative hypothesis is
true. If the prior odds are assumed to be 1, then taking the
inverse allows one to speak to the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis, compared to the null.
For example, imagine a scenario where BF01 = .5. In this
case, the data are half as likely under the null hypothesis as
they are under the alternative hypothesis. Taking the inverse
demonstrates that the data are twice as likely under the alternative hypothesis. Thus, the easiest interpretation of a
Bayes factor is simply taking it at face value, and considering those odds.
Alternatively, there are several authors (Jeffreys, 1961,
Appendix B; Raftery (1995); Wetzels et al., 2011) who have
each developed some guidelines for language that may be
used to discuss and interpret Bayes factors. Their suggested
terminology is shown in Table 4. According to these suggestions, the discussion of the results for Study 1 from Jarosz
and Wiley (2012) could be updated to include the claim that
the results provided strong or very strong evidence for the
alternative hypothesis (with new text in brackets and italics).
The results of this study strongly support the idea that
salient distracters among response options contribute
to the WMC–RAPM correlation. . . . When placed hierarchically into a regression, performance on the high
salience items predicted variance in the composite
span score above and beyond low salience item performance, and remained the only unique predictor.
[Further, the Bayes factor suggested strong evidence for
the role of salient distracters in the RAPM–WMC relationship.] This follows the prediction of the attentional
control account, suggesting that high WMC individuals are better able to avoid distraction from the highly
salient incorrect option within the response bank. (Jarosz & Wiley, 2012, p. 432)
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Table 4.
Interpretation of Bayes Factors as Evidence for Alternative Hypotheses

Statistic
Bayes Factor
1–.33
.33–.10
.10–.05
.05–.03
.03–.01
.01–.0067
<.0067

Inverse of Bayes Factor
1–3
3–10
10–20
20–30
30–100
100–150
>150

The results of the insight rating analysis in Jarosz et al.
(2012) could be said to provide weak or anecdotal evidence
for the null hypothesis, while the analysis of problem solving
performance would be described as strong or very strong in
favor of the alternative hypothesis. For an example of a paper
using Bayes factors alongside traditional NHST, the authors
recommend a recent study by Zwaan and Pecher (2012) examining mental simulation and language comprehension.
Another approach to estimating Bayes factors is to rely on
prior work that has explored the relation between p-values and
Bayes factors. Wetzels and colleagues (2011) used data from
855 t-tests in popular psychology journals to compare evidence from p-values, Bayes factors, and effect sizes (Wetzels
et al., 2011). In general, studies that reported p-values of .05
provided only anecdotal evidence for findings according to a
Bayesian analysis. It is only as p-values approach .01 that evidence starts becoming substantial, according to the calculated Bayes factors (Johnson, 2013; Nuzzo, 2014). Thus, in lieu
of computing Bayes Factors, when p values are less than 0.01
one could cite Wetzels et al. (2011) as evidence that such pvalues are likely to represent what Bayesians would call substantial evidence for an alternative hypothesis. Alternatively,
p-values greater than 0.01 should be interpreted as representing “anecdotal evidence” according to Wetzels et al. (2011).
However, it should be noted that this method is by no means
foolproof, as large sample sizes tend to skew the evidence in
favor of rejecting the null hypothesis when using only p-values
(Wagenmakers, 2007).
A final point made by many who advocate a move away
from NHST is the need for researchers to engage in deeper
statistical thinking. Gigerenzer (1998) considers NHST to
be no better than “ritual handwashing,” a habit followed by
researchers, often with little understanding of why they do
what they do. He suggests that current statistical protocols
followed by many researchers obviate the need for deeper
consideration of alternative models, themes, or positions,
indeed allowing many to avoid specifying hypotheses altogether. In suggesting Bayes factors to support (or even

Support for H1
Raftery
Weak
Positive
Positive
Strong
Strong
Strong
Very Strong

Jeffreys
Anecdotal
Substantial
Strong
Strong
Very Strong
Decisive
Decisive

replace) NHST, the goal is not to simply replace one mindless algorithm with another. Several papers (Edwards et al.,
1963; Gallistel, 2009; Gigerenzer, 1998; Myung & Pitt, 1997)
discuss how obtaining a value beyond some threshold is not
the point of the analysis, and suggest that one of the inherent problems with NHST is that it allows analysis without
throughtful reflection on alternative hypotheses. Rather,
consideration must be given to the calculated probabilities
themselves, what those probabilities say about the relative
strengths of the null and alternative hypotheses, and how
those probabilities inform the greater research question at
hand before any conclusions can be drawn. Likewise, care
must be taken to specify hypotheses in advance, and to consider that the models being compared are specific to those
null and alternative hypotheses. Bayes factors are considerably more conducive to this line of thinking when compared
to traditional NHST. In short, while this paper focuses on
procedure, a procedural shift is only one small part in the
necessary transformation in the way that researchers think
about their data.

Summary
The Bayes factor provides information with a similar purpose to the p-value—to allow the researcher to make a statistical inference about the evidence in an experiment. While
the p-value is widely reported, the Bayes factor provides several advantages, particularly in that it allows the researcher
to make a statement about the alternative hypothesis, rather
than just the null hypothesis. In addition, it provides a clearer estimate of the amount of evidence present in the data.
The BIC approximation, while only a rough estimate of a
Bayes factor, provides a simple way to gain the benefits of
Bayes factors without requiring a statistical background or
additional statistical programs. Other more advanced methods of computation are becoming available, such as the JZS
method or methods for engaging in full Bayesian analyses
using R. While not yet widely used, it is the goal of this paper
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to increase the odds that researchers include some approximation of Bayes factors when reporting the results of their
experiments, particularly in the pages of the Journal of Problem Solving.
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